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Abstract 
As a national ideology, Pancasila has formal quality, but it is also part of 
the material aspects that shapes perspectives that drives national 
policies through the process of consensus. The open and ambiguous 
character of Pancasila allows a wide space for social and political 
interpretation, and therefore is open to critique and reformation 
through reinterpretations of its meaning. An examination of the ethics 
of the socio-political application of Pancasila is crucial in the current 
national climate, and these ethical valuations are formed through 
public discussions and debates on the meaning of Pancasila. Using data 
drawn from mass media. In this paper, I will examine the Government 
Regulation on Law (Perppu) No. 2/2017 as an example of how these 
political ethics develop through the discussion of the meaning of 
Pancasila.  Second, I'll highlight how the space for interpretation of the 
meaning of Pancasila determines how the public, government and 
oppositional coalitions evaluate the pro and contra approaches to 
translating the ideology into practice. Third, in examining the process 
of socio-political consensus as a necessity in the democratic life of 
Indonesia, this paper will position the discursive deployments of 
Pancasila in the ethical and political considerations that stem from the 
practical application of these discourses of Pancasila.  
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1 Introduction 
The discourse surrounding the Government Policy to Replace a Law 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang Undang, henceforth Perppu) 
on mass organizations sparked controversy in the current political 
climate in Indonesia. Published on 10 July 2017, the Perppu Ormas was 
aimed at facilitating the disbandment of transnational Islamic 
organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, on the basis that their activities 
and ideologies are in contradiction with the national ideology of 
Pancasila. Politicians in support of the policy tended to be affiliated 
with the government coalition, with those opposed to the law 
associated with the opposition party. Academics, religious leaders and 
activists also joined in the public discussion and their positions 
reflected the larger discourse and positioning towards the meaning of 
Pancasila for different sectors of society. One clear impact of the policy 
is that it has the potential to be a powerful legal tool for cracking down 
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Pancasila as the ideology and foundation for national life in Indonesia has an open quality, in that 
ideologies are spaces for the production of meaning that are essentially dynamic and must be constantly 
reassessed. The meaning of Pancasila is the result of a process of public discourse in an ideal sense, 
however, the meaning of national ideologies is often set by the government or regime in power. The regime 
in power usually serves as the main source and centre of discourse production in the process of shaping 
the meaning of the national ideology at a given historical period. Regimes have a number of tools that allow 
them to shape and dominate the production of public discourse, and yet they also must dynamically 
respond to the changing aspirations of the public and emerging socio-political realities. As regimes change, 
the discourse shifts and the meaning assigned to ideological orientations towards nationalism changes. The 
meaning ascribed to Pancasila changes along with regimes, it appears that the national ideology in 
Indonesia is tool of power rather than a compact for the aspirations of the public.  
The new government policy on Mass Organizations is considered by some to be a repressive one that 
cripples the freedom for public assembly and association protected by the constitution. The impact on the 
right to freedom of assembly was one argument against the enactment of this policy. Yet the dangers of civil 
society organization's abilities to assemble and voice their aspirations in the public sphere were also 
interpreted, on the other hand, as the source of counter ideologies that represent a threat to Pancasila as 
the basis of the nation.  
The debate over the value of the policy on Mass Organizations is the starting point for what will be 
discussed in this paper. First, is the policy appropriate an appropriate response by the government to 
current social issues in Indonesia? Second, is the public sphere in Indonesia healthy enough to produce 
discourse based on an ethical awareness and the meaning of Pancasila for socio-cultural policy? Another 
important issue is how the social-political process in Indonesian democratic life produces discourse about 
Pancasila in relation to economic interests. From a perspective of political ethics, this paper will use the 
case of the Perppu ormas to theorize about democratic practice in the Pancasila state. 
 
2 Discussion 
2.1 Philosophical Ideas of Pancasila  
Pancasila underwent a transformation in its function at its very formulation. First formally codified in the 
nation's founding principles, it was transformed in the compromise between two groups; one that wanted 
to see Islam play a principle role in the state, and the Nine Committee (Team 9) who championed a 
nationalist state as a compromise towards those hoping to found a religious state. The formulation 
proposed by the Nine Committee was agreed on at the plenary session of the BPUPKI. Pancasila was both 
a mode of compromise as well as the foundation for establishing the Indonesian government (Suwarno, 
1993, p. 76). The principles of Pancasila were intended to be the lived values of humanity in the archipelago, 
which was transformed and integrated into the life of the pre-Independence community.  
These integrated values were identified as living values that became part of the collective consciousness 
of the people of the archipelago. Significant national figures realized these values and used them to create 
an affective awareness to escape from the oppression and injustice of colonial rule. This awareness was 
central to the nationalist movement, encouraging the development of a group   of intellectuals and public 
figures who sought to formulate a scientific study of the values encapsulated in the principles of Pancasila. 
The principles formally became the founding moral and legal basis of the nation. The characteristics of 
Pancasila can be traced back to the ancient kingdoms of Nusantara through the XV century, enriched by the 
contact with the religious values of monotheistic religions as well as the values of the modern West. 
Indonesian thinkers were successful in fostering religious, cultural, socio-political and economic values 
with a philosophical character. These values served as both imperative and operative categories (Suwarno, 
1993, p. 79).  
Professor Notonegoro, an Indonesian scholar who has interpreted Pancasila, proposes that in a 
philosophical sense, Pancasila must be understood through causalis theory. The material realization of 
Pancasila can be seen in the habits, culture and religion of Indonesia. Habit in the wider sense refers to the 
political dimensions of statehood, and the social and economic realms that are stored in the common 
memory of Indonesian society and also within the group. According to Notonegoro, the formulation of 
Pancasila really began in a speech by Soekarno on June 1, 1945 and the opening of the constitution in 1945 
(Notonegoro, 1971, p. 34) Pancasila and the Indonesian state were born through the will of the nation itself.  
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Differing from Notonegoro, Nicolaus Driyarkara understood Pancasila through a phenomenological 
approach. The precepts of Pancasila are the result of human culture translated into the physical world, in 
which humankind enters the physical world and humanizes it. This activity can be said to be culture and 
produce culture. The result of this process of culturalization is embedded in the technical, economic and 
civilizational elements of society (Driyarkara, 1980, p. 34). The existence of the individual relates to others 
according to the structure it entails. In other words, people come out of themselves and enter others, that 
the human consciousness according to the self confronts another. According to him, the existence of man 
is based on the existence of others, originating from love which becomes humanity. The love of others in 
the fulfilment of life will give birth to social justice. In the social-political dimension it will give birth to 
democracy, and in terms of group identity, will become nationality. However, the existence of humans is 
dependent on the causa prima that humans come from God (Driyarkara, 1980, pp. 33-46).  
As the founding father of the nation, its significant that Soekarno chose a theory of nationalism that 
greatly emphasized the desire for unity. Although different in race, culture and socio-economic outlook, the 
desire to be free from colonial domination was strong enough to spur the emergence of leaders from 
different regions. The idea of democracy mentioned in the fourth precept represents Soekarno's efforts to 
accommodate the views of leaders who represented the political and religious diversity of the people.  
According to George Kahin (2003) in his work Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Soekarno was 
a leader who synthesized Western democracy, modern Islam, Marxism, and democratic as well as 
communalistic ideals into a general basis of social thinking for the political elites of the time. In his 
estimation Soekarno used these concepts to elevate the values present in the lives of the archipelago's 
diverse peoples. His eclecticism in formulating Pancasila was a solution to the basic problems of the state 
and the formation of an independent Indonesia (Suwarno, 1993, p. 99). In conceiving of Pancasila, Soekarno 
used the theories of the modern nation to elevate the democratic realities of rural life towards a more 
abstract level that would become the modern democratic nation of Indonesia. All the figures involved in 
the formulation of Pancasila in the early independence period undertook a similar effort to philosophically 
reflect, from various approaches and dimensions, on the values that evolved from Indonesian society.  
From the views on Pancasila discussed earlier, there are various interpretations of Pancasila as form of 
ideology. Pancasila has transformed its meaning and the interpretations about it have changed from the 
time of its formation. It has become a kind of open space for interpretation. As an open ideology in practical 
life, it is determined by the discourses that flourish in society as well as the discourses emerging from the 
ruling regime. Whether the discourse that emerges contains a solid moral justification should be examined 
more deeply. Political ethics is formulated with the aim of achieving public welfare and peaceful living 
based on freedom and justice. The main concern is the implementation of policies in public management. 
The democratic state requires a government committed to maintaining the state responsibly. In state 
affairs, government policies must be clearly defined in term of philosophical priorities, programs, methods, 
and fundamentals (Haryatmoko, 2003, p. 25). An understanding of Pancasila therefore must develop 
through public discourse. In the case of the debate over the Perppu on Mass Organizations, the pro-Perppu 
group assumes that Pancasila is the final ideology, and those groups who do not align themselves with the 
ideology are a threat and must be dissolved. For the contra Perppu groups, Pancasila is not a final ideology 
as its meaning can and must keep changing in order to accurately reflect the will of the people in a given 
historical period. In their eyes, it can even be replaced. Transnational organizations like HTI who have a 
vision of establishing a caliphate refer to the first principle of Pancasila, Belief in One and Only God, as a 
justification for their existence and their right to freedom of association in Indonesia.  
The open nature of Pancasila means that debates over its meaning can be used in the discourse within 
political arenas. This open nature also means the process of community life and national development 
undergoes relatively quick shifts. Pancasila as a lived practice is central to the continued development of 
the nation (Hadi, 1994, p. 46). This means that both the praxis and the instrumental value of the Pancasila 
must be open to change. The instrumental dimension of Pancasila is adapted into the basic values of society 
and is also determined by the context of social and political life. The basic values of Pancasila are universal 
values that are adapted and translated according to the dynamics of community aspirations (Kaelan, 2013). 
The dynamics of society are what determines the creation of a socially just and economically progressive 
national life. 
2.2 Pancasila as an Open Ideology  
Viewed sociologically, Pancasila is seen an open ideology that accommodates the aspirations of society. 
Although stemming from the Marxist tradition, the concept of ideology is more commonly understood 
today as related to discourse and the impact of discourse on society and power. Ideology is no longer 
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understood as ideas and beliefs but has shifted to more distinct focus on the function of language (Giddens, 
2017, pp. 282-286). Scholars from the Frankfurt School understand ideology from a critical perspective, in 
that ideology is a way of connecting ideas with cultural products along with power and power relations. In 
this sense ideology means how ideas are used to promote and legitimize the interests of the dominant 
group. As long as there are class differences within society, the study of ideology of a category of inquiry 
must be continued. Ideology is an important aspect for understanding cultural reproduction.  
In Zizek's estimation, ideology means the empty space of discourse. In Psychoanalysis, the empty space 
is called the real. This empty space of meaning must be filled continuously. The impasse that prevents social 
progress is caused by this meaningless space that must be filled when the old ideology doesn't work 
effectively. It requires action from revolutionary subjects to break the cycle of domination and the frozen 
state of ideology. The subject's belief in the political ideology does not mean that the ideology is objectively 
true. That subjects are not capable of realizing the full reality of politics does mean that they are not loyal 
to the ideology. Political ideology only provides a manner of seeing the world (worldview). Ideology 
mediates the inability of an understanding of reality of an sich such as: a great nation, god, freedom, and 
other concepts removed from the profane things experienced in ordinary life.  
According to Zizek, no regime can achieve a consensus on a prolonged basis according to state ideology, 
unless the ideology encourages the subjects to operate individually or remain free from the meaning of the 
values contained in the ideology. For Zizek, ideology gives us its own reality that allows us to escape from 
the traumatic essence of the real (Zizek, 2008, p. 48). Ideology is not false consciousness in Zizek's 
estimation since it does not distort. For him the fundamental reality cannot be reproduced without 
ideological mystification. Ideology offers a symbolic construction of reality as a way to escape the real 
traumatic effects of life (p. 28).  
Pancasila's open nature stems from its foundation, where leaders engaged in deliberation (musyawarah) 
regarding the principles formation and meaning. All members of the PPKI session approved of this method 
of seeking consensus about the founding principles of the nation. As Pancasila in the Soekarno era was 
interpreted as a dialectic between Islamic thought, nationalism and Marxism, it was also a foundation for 
the nation based in the idea of a nation for all. In the New Order Period, Pancasila was refashioned into a 
single ideology that had to be followed by all political parties, as well as being applied to social-political life 
in public. The New Order approach to Pancasila under Soeharto was characterized by three elements. First, 
the national ideology was explicitly enforced along with a stabilization of political life and economic growth. 
Secondly, the socialization of Pancasila and the Pancasila contract was established as the sole ideology for 
all parties (Ismail, 1996: 78). Through the guidelines of the Instillation and Practice of Pancasila (P4) the 
New Order government made the state ideology a source of dogma and tool for maintaining power.  
The Reformasi era heralded a change in the socio-political situation in Indonesia. Various discourses 
returned from political coordinates. Writings on leftist ideology started to reappear, as well liberal 
ideology. Extreme right groups began to show signs of life. HTI is one example of a mass organization based 
in religion that has an ideology that can be interpreted to be different than Pancasila. Other religion-based 
organizations such as FPI have utilized violence against other citizens due to their ethical and religious 
views, although it's important to note that they characterize their actions as pro-national through their 
interpretation of the government's responsibility to "protect" religion.  
According to Alfian (1982, pp. 104-33), a political scientist who focuses on Pancasila, an ideal ideology 
has three dimensions. In his work Politics, Culture and Humanity in Indonesia, he discusses these three 
dimensions; the dimension of reality, the dimension of idealism, and the dimension of flexibility. The 
dimension of reality is where the concrete institutions of the state emerge within a society. Pancasila plays 
an important role in this dimension as it was introduced as the basis for law and the institutions of the state 
that would encompass a diverse, plural society. in accommodating this plurality, it has the has the capacity 
to survive and can adapt and be developed in the framework of common goals in the life of the nation. 
Pancasila for the values and ideas that existed in pre-independence society. In the idealism dimension, 
Pancasila contains strong aspirations to include all citizens in a united effort to build a better state. In the 
New Order interpretation, the meaning of the precepts was divided in two, with some focusing on the 
humanitarian and democratic aspects of the ideology, while others focused on the divine, religious aspects. 
This divided interpretation diminished Pancasila and its meaning, because Pancasila is a formula for 
interconnected values.   
The flexible dimension of Pancasila refers to the necessity for it to be able to adapt to the social processes 
of Indonesian society. Not only does Pancasila direct social change according to the hopes and aspirations 
of citizens, but according to Alfian, this adaptation requires the continued involvement of the wider society 
in the evaluating and interpreting the ideology's meaning according to the needs of the current historical 
period. It is in this sense that Pancasila can be considered an "open" ideology, one whose underlying spirit 
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doesn't change but can be developed creatively and dynamically to remain relevant in the face of social 
transformations in the life processes of Indonesian society (Oesman, 1991, p. 350) 
An open ideology means the organization of community life based in certain values and ideals. These 
kinds of ideals facilitate the embodiment of values in society. Underlying all this is the ideal for society to 
be free to define itself, with values originating from society through a process in which people decide which 
values must be uplifted and defended. Pancasila needs to be reaffirmed through its application in various 
areas of life. Ideology as a state philosophy cane be said to be open in its orientation, while its translation 
into social political goals and norms can always be questioned and adapted and challenged by emerging 
moral frameworks in society. An open ideology, by definition, must be inclusive, not totalitarian and cannot 
be used to legitimize the power of one group of people (Suseno, 1991, p. 234). It is not something that 
comes from outside of society, but from within. Values and expectations formulated explicitly in the 
constitution is a guide for mobilizing the motivation and ethos of the national community. An open ideology 
should not set operational targets and strategies but instead should become a critical reference to the 
setting of goals, strategies and development (Suseno, 1991, p. 241). As a useful ideology, Pancasila should 
mobilize the potential motivation in society, and eliminate those trends that are not in line with the ideals 
of the Indonesian nation about universal humanity. 
2.3 Pros and Cons of the Policy on Mass Organization 
Since the official implementation of the Government Policy Amending the Law (Perppu) RI No. 2 2017 
(replacing UU No. 17 2013 on civil organizations), various groups have spoken out in support or against 
the policy change. Members of parliament, civil organization leaders, religious leaders, academics have all 
weighed in, indicating that this policy is connected to issues of concern to the Indonesian public. The 
dominant view from those who oppose the legal change is that the policy demonstrates the authoritarian 
nature of President Jokowi's government, and can endanger the people's autonomy and the future of the 
nation. Additionally, the policy threatens the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly guaranteed 
by the constitution, and it is contradictory to the spirit of democracy that animates the national ideology. 
Finally, detractors see the policy as having a large potential for misuse by the current ruling regime and 
those in the future.  
Those in favor of the policy, however, see the legal shift as an effort to reinvigorate the spirit to repair 
the problems of diversity among the people. They interpret the policy as a move to promote tolerance and 
the civil rights of those threatened by intolerant and radical groups in society. This group tends to underline 
that democracy must have limits in order to function properly. If all groups can operate freely, it may 
possibly undermine and threaten the spirit of democracy itself. Several religious groups released 
statements on the publication of the Policy on Mass Organizations. These reactions were cautiously 
optimistic. The Organization of Protestant Churches in Indonesian (PGI) representing churches from across 
the country, circulated information about the change in law, with a statement that government should not 
use it as a tool of power for silencing dissent (Ishanuddin, 2017). They noted that Indonesia is a democratic 
country must provide a space for freedom of expression, and that the law must not be used arbitrarily by 
the government to reduce the space for the expression of different group's aspirations. A similar opinion 
was expressed by the chairman of the Muslim Ulama Council (MUI), Ma'ruf Amin. He stated that the law 
should not be used as a tool for targeting any groups either to the right or left sides of the political spectrum, 
and that the law must not be used a tool for control. He also said that he hoped that HTI was the last group 
dissolved under the policy, as other groups that are seen as a threat can be disabled through counseling, 
which the MUI is willing to provide (Rahadian, 2017). The Vice Chairman of MUI, Zainut Tauhid Saadi stated 
the Perppu must act against all organizations that have orientations contrary to national ideology that 
endanger NKRI. Saadi proposed that the government should not only prioritize the legal and security 
approaches to handling anti-Pancasila organizations. However, MUI considered the Perppu reasonable. 
They see the president as possessing a subjective right to determine the meaning of the compelling crisis 
in the Indonesian public. Under the amended law, mass organizations cannot abuse, blaspheme, desecrate 
or violate religion. They are also prohibited from participating in any activities that threaten the 
sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia or embracing and disseminating any ideas that 
contradict Pancasila (Idhom, 2017).  
The response from leaders of several Islamic organizations is notable, in that these groups often reject 
democracy as an imported Western concept that is associated with infidels and secular liberalism. 
However, these same groups opposed the law as threat to human rights and democracy, concepts that they 
have previously found incompatible with their religious beliefs. In the case of the Perppu, the accused the 
government of being undemocratic and violating the spirit of the constitution. However, the government 
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felt that the dissolution of HTI through the law which resulted in the revocation of the group's legal status 
by Ministry of Law and Human Rights, was reasonable given that the HTI was guilty of attacking the 
foundations of the nation, as well as the values of religion, brotherhood, and national pluralism. 
Government officials stated that they had heard and considered the concerns coming from a number of 
sectors of society, including religious leaders who called for the protection of tolerance, nationalism and 
diversity (Alqurtuby, 2017).  
Furthermore, according to Sumanto Al Qurtuby from the Scientific Research in Social Sciences at King 
Fahd University, Democracy must have limits. Democracy in Indonesian is not the secular-liberal 
democracy found in the West, but instead a system based on the values of local wisdom, the foundations of 
Indonesian nationalism and the values that emerge from Pancasila. Pancasila democracy is not a value-free, 
'unhindered' system that tolerates elements that can potentially create conflict and division. Indonesia is 
not a secular-liberal system, nor is it an Islamic state. It is a Pancasila state. Civil organizations must submit 
to the ideology of the state. This policy does have the potential to be misused, just as the constitution and 
holy books can be misused. The intention of the policy, however, is to identify groups that promote acts of 
rebellion, intolerance and radicalism. In Al Qurtuby's view (2017), the Perppu is a positive move to prevent 
the kinds of disturbances seen in regions like the Middle East and Central Asia where many groups non-
humanistic radical religious groups have emerged.  
The group that has most vociferously protested the change to the law on civil/mass organizations is HTI 
itself, as they were first target of the policy's application. In statement from their representative Ismail 
Yusanto, HTI accused the government of creating the Perppu as manoeuvre specifically designed to allow 
for the dissolution of civil organizations. The policy enabled the government to dissolve HTI. The group 
claimed that the policy is form of tyranny, and arbitrarily targets groups that politically unpopular 
(Shantika, 2017). House of Representatives member from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) Jazuli Juwaini 
took a similar stance in his statement, saying that the government needed to explain the reason for the 
creation and legalization of the policy. Furthermore, he noted that PKS was concerned about the legal 
change, because it was based on a number of ambiguous legal articles and that it also bypasses normal legal 
processes. PKS members were of the opinion that the policy raises concern over the government’s 
commitment to following the due processes of justice and the rule of law. They also noted that HTI was 
never invited to speak or engage in dialogue with government officials in the process of the policy's 
creation, and therefore represents a form of repression towards Islam by the state. Deputy Chairman of the 
House of Representatives Fahri Hamzah stated that the policy and the circulation of documents containing 
the names of members and sympathizers of HTI was not only unethical but also illegal, since the document 
could trigger discrimination or persecution. Fadli Zon, vice Chairman of the House of Representatives, 
expressed similar concerns that the policy indicates the decline of democracy and the new mode of 
dictatorship, since the government can now dissolve organizations without due process of law (Videlia, 
2017). 
Several foreign media outlets like the Washington Post (Tempo.co, 2017) wrote that human rights 
activists perceived that this policy decision by President Joko Widodo violates the rights of freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly (Akbar, 2017). Although this change to law No. 17 2013 was ushered 
in by the president and considered to be violation of rights by some, it was supported by moderate Islamic 
groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama. The Star Tribune quoted Andreas Harsono from Human Rights Watch as 
saying that the Indonesian government has the authority to crack down on groups that violate the law. 
However, to dissolve such groups is cruel action. "Banning organizations based on their ideology is cruel 
action that undermines the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. This is despite the fact 
that Indonesians have struggled to develop these rights since the Suharto dictatorship" he said. 
The government's official statement, made through the Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, 
provided three reasons for the dissolution of HTI under the amended law. First, as a legal entity, HTI has 
not played positive role in furthering the development of the nation. Second, the activities undertaken by 
the group are in conflict with the objectives, principles and guiding characteristics of Pancasila and the 
constitution as stipulated in Law No. 17 2013 on civil organizations. Third, HTI activities are considered to 
have engendered conflicts in the community that can threaten public order and the integrity of the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia (Movanita, 2017).   
Wiranto underlined that the government had sufficient reason to amend the law through the 2017 
policy. He noted that currently Indonesia faces an ideological threat from organizations that seek to replace 
Pancasila. He also pointed to the existence of organizations that implement anti-nationalist and anti-
democratic campaigns in the public sphere. Furthermore, the original law from 2013 did not provide a 
strong enough legal basis for the government to act against these types of organizations (Erdianto, 2017).  
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An editorial column published by Media Indonesia (2017) seemed to be in support of the policy, noting 
that it's application was in line with a decision by the constitutional court that says the president has the 
right to create policy on a basis of need in critical situations or to address legal concerns quickly. Secondly, 
the country's legal rules are not yet fully developed, and the option of presidential policy helps to address 
the gaps in the legal system. Third, the president may create policy in the case that gaps in the legal system 
cannot be adequately addressed with the creation of new law. Given these considerations, the author of the 
editorial finds that the president's amendment of the 2013 is neither arbitrary nor according to the 
president's personal whims. Therefore, the Perppu is based on the rule of law, and addresses a real threat 
to the stability of the nation.   
As the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama's support for the Perppu is influential. 
Head of the Harian Tanfidziyah PBNU, Robikin Emas of the organization expressed his support for the 
policy, as a method of overcoming the polemic surrounding groups that NU sees as radical, such as HTI. He 
argued that the policy would "speed up the legal process addressing radical groups without suppressing 
constitutional rights." According to NU, HTI is a radical, anti-Pancasila organization, and their existence 
endangers the existence of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, threatening the nation's unity. "Since it's clear 
that HTI denies the plurality of the Indonesian public that has existed for hundreds of years, and they have 
been proven to be anti-Pancasila given their promotion of the concept of a caliphate that is no longer even 
used in Islamic nations." He added that HTI has even been rejected by many Islamic states worldwide 
(Friana, 2017).   
Pancasila Ideology as a space of interpretation in the debate over this policy in the current political 
climate in Indonesia, an understanding of Pancasila as an ideology needs to be rekindled. In contemporary 
social scientific and philosophical thought, ideologies are not understood as beliefs or systems of thought 
but rather as a type of discourse. The function of ideology is to connect ideas with cultural products and life 
practices. Pancasila as an ideology in cultural life must influence the life of Indonesian culture. It implies 
the need for cultural politics or cultural strategies based on Pancasila (Sastrapratedja, 2013, p. 179). 
Debates over the development and application of the presidential policy amending the law on mass 
organizations can be interpreted as a struggle for political and cultural power. Groups in support of the 
policy are in line with government in upholding the state's interest in controlling those organizations that 
are suspected of wanting to replace Pancasila with an alternative ideology. This policy was created with 
the goal of controlling organizations that are openly in conflict with Pancasila and who promote anti-
democratic and anti-national ideas by the government's estimation. Those groups who rejected the policy 
are aligned with a coalition of government opposition groups. Utilizing the political moment when the 
discourse about the policy was enlivening the public space, both anti-government groups and radical 
organizations sought to disrupt political stability through assuring their discourse was dominant. However, 
these groups had different reasons and interpretations of Pancasila despite the appearance of being on the 
same side of the debate. This demonstrates the lack of a solid understanding and a process of actualization 
of Pancasila values that has characterized the reformation-era public engagement with the ideology. This 
lack of an engaged, inclusive public discourse about Pancasila has left a vacuum that is being filled from 
different quarters which can be seen in the emergence of pockets of leftist, liberal and Islamist ideologies 
in post 1998 Indonesia (Said Ali, 2012:143). These ideologies attempt to fill the gap where the actualization 
of Pancasila has failed. The dynamic and fast-moving character of socio-political life in Indonesia requires 
a return to the instrumental and practical domains of the ideology. Pancasila's value as a guiding principle 
for the nation has been obscured and abandoned. Furthermore, the lack of serious academic and 
philosophic attention to the ideology as a form of praxis has led people away from the principles it 
represents.  
Pancasila was born out of the culture of Indonesia and is an essential part of the nation's identity. 
Pancasila's ideological function as a container for diversity and the aspirations of all the citizens of 
Indonesia must be maintained. Organizations with an agenda that contradicts Pancasila are a threat to the 
continued application of the ideology as the basis for the nation, as well as the unity of the people. The 
ideological claims of radical mass organizations should not be allowed to replace this foundation that is 
based in the everyday diversity of Indonesia religious, ethnic, and regional. Coming from this diversity, 
Pancasila importantly accommodates pluralism, which is necessary to maintaining the rights of all in a 
diverse population. Social transformation must be rooted in everyday life, and collective values developed 
creatively and dynamically in the dialectic relationship between Pancasila as the abstraction of public life 
that is realized through the public's interpretation of it. This is where Pancasila's open nature is most 
essential and must remain a space for interpretation. In that space, the discourse on values, both practical 
and instrumental, can be adapted to the developing context of society. This is a space where the aspirations 
of the people shape political will and influence the ruling institutions of the state. The government policy 
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on Mass Organizations is implicitly aimed at maintaining the basic orientation of the nation. This is a kind 
of corrective which shapes political life.  
Pancasila constructively challenges the people of Indonesia to live according to the values of culture, 
tolerance, religion and justice. This is the intention of the ideology. In that sense Pancasila is an abstraction 
of that represents the idea of the contents of the state itself. Although Ramage claims that contestation 
about the meaning of Pancasila predominately comes from within the state itself (Ramage, 1995, p. 123). 
the debate over the Perppu shows that public discourse is also factor in defining and redefining the meaning 
of Pancasila, a polysemous concept that may have a number of competing definitions at any given historical 
point. Ramage may be right in pointing out that most of the dominant discourse about Pancasila is produced 
by the state, but that does not mean the state can the emergence of contending definitions in the public 
sphere. As the ideology is open enough embraces various views from different political sectors, it has a 
unifying function. However, the government also tends to use it to limit and regulate political behavior. 
Often, this is done through moral appeals by the state, which can be taken up in different ways by the public. 
In this case, all sides claim that theirs is a moral imperative in their position. For those who are pro-Perppu, 
the moral imperative is in protecting the nation from a perceived threat to Pancasila as an essential 
guarantor of national coherence. For those against the law, it violates the freedoms of people to maintain 
their own moral orientations within the framework of the state.  
The underlying issue in this debate is how Pancasila should function in determining the limits of 
democracy. Political freedom and the space for free expression is guaranteed by the constitution, and yet it 
is the discourse produced in these spaces which the state feels it must regulate as function of control. It is 
here that speech and persuasion play a central role in determining how far the government can use appeals 
to safety and the protection of Pancasila to enforce their interpretation of the ideology. In representing 
plurality in the Arendtian sense as the distinctive and absolute feature of the whole condition of political 
life (Arendt, 1958, pp. 41-42), Pancasila becomes a unifying symbol through political action can unfold. If 
politics is concerned with all aspects of the human condition plurality cannot be avoided. Political action 
presupposes plurality or census, which means there will also be rejection, approval, conflict and 
cooperation in determining what is right in society.  
In the discourse about Pancasila in the course of the public debates over the Perppu, the identities of 
different groups are realized and recast or reaffirmed through speech. This action of defining the meaning 
of Pancasila is how the ideology is applied in public policy and made material. The space of discourse 
provided by Pancasila becomes a space of freedom for the expression of the aspirations of a number of 
different groups as it is kept free of threats and intimidation that negate plurality. Speech in public debates 
ceases to be political when words are reduced to weapons in propaganda wars (Arendt, 1958, p. 180) or 
when intimidation limits the expression of plurality. This is what the government struggles within the 
defense of Pancasila: how to limit ideologies that threaten plurality and diversity without quashing the 
ability for different and often contradictory interpretations to enter into the process of public discourse.  
The definition of Pancasila and how is concretized must be reached through a process of consensus. 
However, consensus means preserving the space and flexibility for the emergence of contradictory and 
competing claims into public discourse for wider consideration. The public then evaluates the sincerity and 
validity of the claims of different groups.  Pancasila represents an ideal of a common basic belief about how 
we live humanly in the nation and state of Indonesia. Plurality is accepted as a distinctive feature of the 
Indonesian nation, with the goal of preventing any group from imposing their beliefs on all or claiming that 
their perspective represents the universal voice. The meaning of Pancasila means requiring the acceptance 
of a political consensus that underlies the nationality of the Indonesian nation (Suseno, 1986, p. 113). And 
this will always be accompanied by conflict as groups compete to have their voice gain traction and power 
in the process of consensus. As actors compete to see their vision of what is the natural and moral way to 
define difference instantiated and accepted as part of the nation (Mouffe, 2013, pp. 30-31), they engage in 
the process creating not only new common sense frames for recognition, but for also for defining the 
parameters of inclusion that Pancasila protects.  
The meaning and actualization of Pancasila must change according to the context of generation and era 
in the development of the nation's history. The cognitive aspect of Pancasila ideology requires openness to 
criticism, rational argumentation, and dialogue between science and Pancasila, and these debates over who 
represents Pancasila (and who doesn't) are part of these processes of cognition. The emotive aspect of 
Pancasila involves the process of appreciating the ideological meaning of life (Sastrapratedja, 2013, pp. 
326-7).  
In the midst of the composition of Indonesian society consisting of many different tribes, religions, 
cultures, and classes, Pancasila as consensus requires a concerted effort to develop, interpret, and interpret 
the continuing values and basic life-views contained therein  
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3 Conclusions 
Pancasila is an open space for the constructive interpretation of its meaning for life of the state and the 
nation. The need for a healthy public space that facilitates discourse is a condition for the continued ability 
of Pancasila to reflect the aspirations of the public in their understanding and interpretation of it. However, 
Pancasila as an ideology has the potential to be misused if it is applied as tool for suppression or 
intimidation by the ruling regime. This potential for ideological misuse can be anticipated by open attitudes 
to rational ideals, critical analysis, and an academic dialogue about the values enshrined within Pancasila's 
principles. Pancasila must be grounded in a process by which it is realized in social practice, and that 
process requires the involvement of all parties in a joint effort to foster public reasoning to facilitate a 
healthy public discourse.   
Political ethics describes a worldview in which ethical-rational considerations become central to the life 
of the nation. The main objective of the government is to regulate the life of the nation, public good, national 
development, and social justice for all Indonesian people. Public discussion as for space contestation 
meaning, and the practice of national life finds expression in Pancasila as moral orientation for the nation. 
Plural public discourse can be tested through the debates over the social ethics of Pancasila. If citizens can 
be actively involved in overseeing public policy through public opinion, and management can be carried 
out fairly by the authorities, then debates over Pancasila are part of the agonistic tendencies of a plural 
democracy that can rightfully be seen as political.  Communities' constitution as a hot issue in public 
discourse becomes a marker of a disseminated political reality. 
The existence of groups promoting ideologies to replace Pancasila becomes a marker of can be potential 
threat to the public space if they are intended to silence debate through intimidate or violence, because a 
healthy public sphere requires the government to maintain a safe space for discourse to flourish. The policy 
on mass organizations was intended by the government to protect Pancasila, but it implicitly seeks to 
protect public space from groups who seek to control discourse through repression and intimidation in 
their devaluation of the national ideology that remains intentionally open and can be claimed and 
interpreted by all citizens equally. The appraisal of the appropriateness of the issuance of the Perppu 
should be seen a priori, in the sense of whether the impacts and consequences of such policies contribute 
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